Notes d’épisode
This week we talk about the collapse of a Paraguayan bank, the removal of a president, and a struggle inside one of the world’s longest-serving ruling parties.
We also discuss deposit insurance, public pension money, and the difference between political accountability and criminal guilt.
Recommended Book: Three Parts Dead by Max Gladstone
Transcript
In Paraguay, a country of around six million people, the accounts of a bank with close to three million customers were suddenly frozen on November third. People couldn’t withdraw their savings, transfer money, or use their cards. And while the government began returning some of these frozen deposits within days, a great many people were left wondering when, and whether, they would get all their money back.
Three days later, the country’s president, Santiago Peña, was out of office.
Peña had been elected in 2023. He offered to resign as the bank crisis grew, but lawmakers rejected that resignation and removed him through an impeachment vote instead. His vice president, Pedro Alliana, is now president, while Peña faces criminal charges connected to the bank’s collapse. He denies wrongdoing, and those charges have not been proven in court.
What I’d like to talk about today is how a bank failure became a presidential crisis, and why the removal of one leader may not change the underlying political system that allowed this situation to develop in Paraguay.
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The bank was called Ueno, spelled U-E-N-O, and it enjoyed a remarkably rapid rise in Paraguay. It began operating under that name in 2021, won a banking license in 2023, and absorbed an established bank called Visión the following year. It offered an easy-to-use digital account, generous rebates on everyday purchases, and a familiar name: it sponsored Paraguay’s national soccer team and slathered its branding across the country.
Its growth wasn’t just the consequence of aggressive advertising, though. Ueno reached people traditional banks had often missed. According to the bank, more than a million Paraguayans opened their first bank account with them. And again, in 2026 it reported roughly three million customers, making its failure a problem for a substantial share of the country’s adults, and something like half of the country’s total population.
And it wasn’t just normal people: public institutions were putting money in there, too. By the time Ueno failed, it held around $850 million in public deposits, roughly 30% of the money deposited with the bank. That included money from the country’s social security institution, pension funds, and operators of its large hydroelectric dams. So this wasn’t only a question of individual savings accounts. Money intended for retirement and public services was involved, as well.
Let’s talk about banking in general, real quick, to better understand what happened here, and how a bank this successful could suffer an outcome this bad.
When you deposit money, that deposit becomes an obligation the bank owes you. The…
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